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A Critical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards a Global Governance 
Framework 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to outline the structural limits of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and develop a framework for the global governance of CSR. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper adopts a critical perspective on emerging 
discourses of CSR in developing a governance framework. 
Findings – Win-Win situations do not capture the complexities of business and society 
relationships and a more democratic governance framework is needed to minimize the harm that 
results from corporate activity. 
Research implications/limitations – More attention should be paid to the outcomes of CSR 
initiatives and in investigating the discursive, strategic and regulatory dimensions of power that 
emerge from the governance of CSR. 
Social implications:  Non-corporate and non-market actors and civil society actors have greater 
influence in governing corporate behavior. 
Originality/value – The paper focuses on the political economy of corporations rather than on 
firm level CSR initiatives thus providing a richer and multidisciplinary perspective on the role of 
corporations in society. 
Keywords – Corporate social responsibility, democratic governance, civil society. 
Paper type – Conceptual 
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Corporations should be and could be a major force for resolving environmental and social 
concerns in the 21st century. 
William Ford, Jr., 2004. 
 
Corporate social responsibility is a dangerous distortion of business principles.  If you find an 
executive who wants to take on social responsibilities, fire him. Fast. 
Peter Drucker, 2004. 
 
As the above quotes indicate, the tensions between social and economic good have always 
occupied an uneasy position in organization studies.  In recent years corporations have been 
asked to play a key role in addressing issues that appear to go beyond their primary economic 
function, for instance corporations are increasingly being urged to tackle issues like global 
poverty, human rights, and climate change (United Nations, 2006).  Whether corporations are 
equipped to play such a role is in some doubt:  while there is a long history of corporate 
engagement with the broader society through philanthropy and community development, the 
primary function of a corporation remains firmly focused on profit generation, which limits the 
extent of a corporation’s involvement with broader social issues.  In this paper I argue that the 
corporation in its current form is an inappropriate agent for positive social change.  Lest this 
sound too polemic let me hasten to add that I am not attempting to paint corporations as ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’, rather I want to identify the limits of corporate social initiatives, limits that are 
generated by a particular form of corporate rationality arising from fundamental ideological and 
political assumptions about the nature of a corporation and its role in society.  The unit of 
analysis is not so much the individual corporation, rather I focus on how power dynamics 
between market, state and civil society actors create particular notions of corporate social 
responsibility in the political economy that determine the boundaries of what a corporation can 
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or cannot do to promote positive social change.  The limits of corporate rationality determine the 
limits of corporate social responsibility (CSR) because if a corporation ‘can do good only to help 
itself do well, there is a profound limit on just how much good it can do’ (Bakan, 2004: 50).  In 
the paper I discuss alternate arrangements between corporations and stakeholders that could 
overcome the limits of CSR.      
Critiques of CSR point to the limits underlying the win-win assumptions of CSR strategies 
(Banerjee, 2007).  The limits arise from both the structure of the modern corporation and the 
political economy in which it is embedded.  The current structure and purpose of corporations is 
designed to deliver shareholder value, which limits a corporation’s ability to pursue social goals. 
As Margolis and Walsh (2003) have pointed out the ‘practical necessities’ of stakeholder theory 
have meant that normative justifications beyond that of providing shareholder value have not 
gained significant ground in theory or practice.  The focus is almost entirely on win-win 
situations where a particular ‘social’ initiative is evaluated by its economic benefit to the firm.  
Commenting on the results of a meta-analysis of more than 25 years of empirical studies on the 
link between corporate economic and social performance, Orlitzky et al. (2003) claimed that the 
literature was ‘over inclusive’ in defining organizational stakeholders and called for a more 
‘restrictive’ concept of stakeholders in order to establish a stronger link.  This implies a focus on 
stakeholders who can influence the financial or competitive position of the firm, leaving little or 
no resources directed to serve the interests of marginalized stakeholder groups.  
 For CSR to produce social outcomes that are not necessarily constrained by corporate 
rationality there needs to be a change in the normative framework of public decision making at 
the institutional level.  Current theories and practices of CSR are not strong enough to constrain 
the destructive effects of some corporate activity.  When market failure is accompanied by state 
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failure civil society actors and institutions play an important role in protecting social welfare.  
Thus, alternative conceptualizations of CSR involve interventions at multiple levels by multiple 
actors, which imply some form of governance of CSR that goes beyond conventional theories of 
corporate governance.  The new development regime also requires a new global governance 
regime if international development decisions are to be governed by democratic principles 
(Sanders, 2012).  The new regime requires more voices in the governance of corporations and 
marks a significant shift in CSR from a corporation interacting with its stakeholders to a 
corporation itself becoming a stakeholder.  What are the implications for societal governance of 
corporate activity as opposed to government regulation of corporate activity?  What institutional 
and authority structures are needed to develop a more inclusive concept of the social in the 
political economy?  In the next section I will explore these questions and discuss some 
possibilities for a global governance framework for CSR.   
 
TOWARDS A GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR CSR 
 The way corporations are currently structured and governed coupled with the norms of 
the broader political economy implies that any alternate visions of a corporation must necessarily 
involve alternate visions of the economy and polity as well.  Such a transformation cannot be 
expected to occur at the level of the firm, hence the need to understand the larger political 
economy of CSR and the governance issues that arise from a political economic approach to 
CSR.  Political democracy and democratic systems of governance are key enabling conditions of 
a global governance system for CSR. 
 Recovering the social from the economic and re-embedding it in contemporary 
institutional and corporate structures and processes is a challenge faced by many critical 
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theorists, social activists, environmental organizations and NGOs.  Voices calling for a 
transformation of the business-society relationship focus on two themes: promoting democratic 
forms of governance at the institutional level and increasing accountability at the corporate level.  
Reformists argue that there is a deficit of democracy in the present global economic system and 
decisions are made at the global level by non-democratic and unaccountable actors that have 
deleterious effects on large segments of the population, especially the poor.  As Deetz (1992) 
argues, decision-making in the public sphere is democratic only in the legislative domain 
because it involves elected representatives.  No such public representation exists in the 
administrative and corporate domains, in fact according to Deetz (1992: 16) ‘the modern 
corporation is the most protected from direct public control and it is there that most decisions are 
made’.  The political role of business, their influence over governmental institutions and their 
role in delivering public responsibilities once the sole purview of states can lead to both a 
democracy deficit and governance deficit (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007).  
 Theoretical efforts to develop such transnational democratic modes of governance have 
focused on notions of deliberative democracy developed by Habermas (1996) and Rawls (1993).  
Deliberative democracy is posed as an alternative to conventional liberal democracies where 
there was a clear separation between the political and the economic (Bohman, 1998; Gutman and 
Thompson, 2004).  However, such a distinction is misleading: political, economic and social 
spheres interact in multiple circuits of power and through the power-knowledge nexus create 
forms of democracy that are contingent on particular forms of authority (the power to create and 
enforce laws including ‘soft’ laws such as voluntary codes of conduct, standards and guidelines); 
capability (organizational or institutional capability to perform or participate in the decision-
making process) and legitimacy (being in compliance with the law or in accordance with 
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established or accepted patterns and standards).   
 Calls for a more democratic control over global economic policies imply some form of 
global governance.  Effective regulation of power requires what Wolf (2008) calls ‘meta-
governance’ or governance of governance which requires allocating institutional capabilities that 
enable the weak to be protected from the strong.  The legal framework that can provide such 
protection requires public actors.  Thus, private governance requires a multi-level multi-actor 
public framework to govern itself.  Global governance is defined as ‘the complex of formal and 
informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, 
markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through which collective 
interests on the global plane are articulated, rights and obligations are established, and 
differences are mediated’ (Weiss and Thakur, 2006, p. 4).  Global governance arrangements 
emerge from interactions between market, state and civil society actors and go beyond 
conventional treaty-based international agreements between states or command-and-control 
domestic forms of regulation.  The involvement of a variety of actors with differing interests, 
capabilities and resources lead to new institutional forms and a variety of regulatory and 
voluntary compliance mechanisms (Wolf, 2008). 
 While increased NGO and public pressure in a variety of arenas may not yet have been 
translated into legal mechanisms they have forced corporations to change some of their more 
damaging practices.  Some theorists claim that increasing corporate engagement with state and 
non-state actors can result in a more democratically embedded form of governance (Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2007).  However, due to the absence of any global monitoring and enforcement 
mechanism there is a danger that CSR could become a privatized system of governance lacking 
public accountability (Levy and Kaplan, 2007).  Even high profile global forums such as the 
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United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), which encourages corporations to sign up to a charter 
of human rights, remain limited in their impact because of the lack of any enforceability 
apparatus.  The focus is more on reporting processes than actual outcomes of corporate activity.  
And like CSR, the rationale provided is a ‘business case’ for human rights where the assumption 
is that corporations that adhere to human rights principles will benefit from enhanced reputation 
and image, reduce costs, and maintain their license to operate (Banerjee, 2007).  While the 
UNGC does not mark a radical reconceptualization of CSR it has resulted in increased 
partnerships between the corporate sector and international agencies.  Monitoring and assessment 
of these partnerships is required to see if they produce meaningful social outcomes or whether 
participation in the Global Compact is a form of ‘bluewashing’ where corporations wrap their 
credentials in the blue UN flag to escape scrutiny of their actions at the global level.  The lack of 
accountability, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms is a fundamental problem with the 
plethora of human right declarations, codes of conduct, standards, compacts, policies, statements, 
reports.   
There is little if any empirical evidence suggesting that corporations benefit from having 
a good record on human rights or that companies with a bad record of human rights are 
economically disadvantaged.  The financial and business risks of violating human rights may be 
outweighed by the benefits of investments in corrupt regions and there is no evidence to suggest 
that corporations are being punished financially by investors or markets based on their human 
rights record.  Signing up to a code of human rights can easily become a substitute for ending 
human rights violations without questioning the dynamics of power that create the space for 
violations.  The question of power also remains unresolved: many NGOs simply do not have the 
resources or power to participate effectively in global policy making.  Some private bodies may 
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not be interested in participating in policy development.  Democratic participation can become 
dominated by sectoral interests (the global climate change regime is a good example where 
sectoral interests have dominated the public agenda).  Thus, traditional sources of legitimacy like 
nation states and their political institutions are also required in a global governance framework 
because private actors, who may be legitimate participants in a governance system because of 
their resources and expertise, do not have the authority to both create and maintain the regulatory 
framework within which they operate.  Thus, in the contemporary political economy there are 
differences in the capability and authority of corporations, governments and NGOs to influence 
decision-making and participate in global governance.  Some of these differences are highlighted 
in Figure 1.  A key question is whether corporate participation in global forums should be 
expanded or whether its influence can be reduced.  The influence of corporations in various UN 
bodies has been documented in the United Nations’ own reports and perhaps a more effective 
antidote to their rising influence is to develop clear accountability and enforcement mechanisms 
with more representative public participation through civil society organizations (Banerjee, 
2012). 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
             ---------------------------------------------- 
 In a traditional command and control regime governments have the legitimacy, authority, 
and capability for decision-making that affects public interests.  In a democratic society citizens 
can demand accountability from their elected represents and can vote for a change in government 
if they feel one is needed.  Non-governmental organizations like community and environmental 
activist groups can demand new legislation from governments to promote social and 
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environmental welfare.  They also negotiate directly with corporations in an attempt to change 
particular forms of corporate behavior.  The capacity of activist groups and NGOs to influence 
both government policy and corporate strategy depends both on the legitimacy and power (level 
of funding, scope and reach of membership, level of participation in different networks) of 
particular groups.  The extent of direct authority to act or develop policy is limited for these 
groups.    
 Figure 2 presents a global governance framework that includes both firm-level and 
political-economic level aspects of CSR.  Each level has strategic and regulatory features arising 
from power dynamics in the political economy that provide the basis for a governance 
framework which is discussed below. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
Strategic and Regulatory Features of CSR Governance 
 Strategic governance features operate at the political-economic level and at the level of 
the firm.  At the level of political economy the dynamics of institutional, material and discursive 
power determine the authority, capability and legitimacy of market, state and civil society actors.  
Depending on their authority and capability to participate in decision-making civil society actors 
can forge transnational alliances with other groups, enter into public-private partnerships with 
state and market actors, and participate in the development of ‘soft governance laws’ such as 
codes of conduct, standards and policies (Levy and Kaplan, 2007).  At the level of the firm 
strategic governance features can involve expanding the role of directors to include 
environmental and social governance apart from corporate governance (Parkinson, 2003), 
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developing comprehensive stakeholder engagement strategies (Aguilera et al., 2007; Freeman, 
1984), or promoting workplace democracy (Kelly, 2001).     
 Strategic governance features, especially at the firm level are discretionary and at the 
political economic level depend on the willingness and capability of market, state and civil 
society actors to engage with each other.  In contrast, regulatory governance features provide an 
enforcement apparatus at both the level of the firm and the political economy.  At the firm level, 
regulatory governance measures include mandatory reporting of social and environmental 
impact, extended corporate liability, and stakeholder voting rights in strategic corporate 
decisions that have significant social and environmental impacts.  At the level of political 
economy there is a need for more institutional accountability and international laws, permits and 
sanctions to protect social welfare of marginalized groups.  Affected communities should have 
legal rights for redress, for example through the Alien Torts Claim Act (Ramasastry, 2002) or 
veto rights over developmental projects that threaten their livelihoods.   
 If deliberative democracy highlights the interface between the market, state and civil 
society what is the role of the corporation as a key non-state actor in the political economy?  
According to Scherer and Palazzo (2007) in the context of deliberative democracy CSR can 
serve as the link between state, civil society and market actors and through a system of 
participatory dialogue with civil society and state actors in an explicit political process that 
perhaps may permit a more ‘democratic control on the public use of corporate power’.  While 
participatory dialogue may increase transparency of corporate decisions it is not clear how 
corporate participation in deliberate democracy can give non-corporate actors ‘democratic 
control’ over corporate actions.  The problem of unequal power dynamics between state, 
corporate and civil society actors remains.  If the capacity of corporations to do social good is 
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constrained by the corporate form and purpose, their capacity to do social harm is constrained by 
external forces, but to a much lesser extent.  Open dialogue between conflicting interests may 
manufacture an uneasy form of consent, perhaps offer better transparency but it still does not 
address how accountability can be established and enforced in the context of deliberate 
democracy.  Public-private partnerships may represent a more participatory approach to 
development but the rules governing these partnerships tend to be framed by business through 
structural and discursive power relations (Fuchs and Lederer, 2007).  As Mouffe (2000: 14) 
argues, if relations of power are constitutive of the social, then the ‘main question for democratic 
politics is not how to eliminate power but how to constitute forms of power more compatible 
with democratic values’. 
The key difference between state regulation of corporations and societal governance of 
corporations is that hierarchical state-society or state-market relations are replaced by horizontal 
public-private partnerships involving deliberate cooperation and bargaining.  The Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) is an example of a deliberate mode of governance involving private 
actors such as corporations and their suppliers, environmental NGOs, community groups, human 
rights activists and Indigenous groups.  The FSC was created to fill the governance gap after the 
failure of governments to agree on global forest protection standards at the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development.  The FSC certifies timber and timber products to 
ensure they are ‘sustainably harvested’ and do not come from felling of old growth forests.  
However, the scale of these so-called sustainable operations is miniscule: in the U.S. only 7% of 
total forested area is under FSC certification (compared to 30% in Europe) and FSC certified 
wood products account for 1% of total sales of wood and wood products in the U.S. (5% in 
Europe) (Vogel, 2005).  While the FSC claims these standards have had a ‘measurable impact’ in 
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preserving old-growth forests in North America and Europe, the rate of tropical forest 
destruction and loss of biodiversity continues unabated in the poorer regions of the world and has 
accelerated instead of declined in recent years, which raises questions about the effectiveness of 
voluntary standards for environmental protection. 
 Apart from institutional capability there is the question of which actors can exercise 
authority in any governance arrangement.  One of the limitations of a deliberative CSR approach 
is that it tends to overestimate the capacity and authority of civil society actors. And while NGOs 
play a crucial role in promoting deliberative democracy a critical perspective on the governance 
of CSR does not assume that NGOs automatically hold the moral high ground when it comes to 
social and environmental issues.  NGOs and civil society actors may not be profit driven, but 
their power and legitimacy to represent marginalized groups must also be scrutinized along with 
their motives and intentions.  All NGOs do not necessarily represent interests of marginalized 
communities and neither are all outcomes of NGO strategies beneficial to the communities they 
represent.  Civil society actors sometimes can merely serve as instruments of state policy.  They 
can also manipulate states and market actors to further their own agendas.  A critical perspective 
in analyzing social movements would examine the policies, practices, modes of governance, 
power dynamics underlying their interactions with other stakeholders and the conflicting 
discursive rationalities they produce.  This might yield valuable insights on how social problems 
are articulated along with the contradictions, modes of resistance, struggles and tensions between 
social movements and economic agendas (Grewal, 2005; Zald, 2002). 
 A key question in the governance of CSR is whether a corporation can be made legally 
accountable for its social responsibilities (de Jonge, 2011). A variety of legal mechanisms could 
be used to encourage, even enforce the discretionary and voluntary aspects of CSR.  Arguing that 
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the law by itself does not guarantee good corporate behavior Parker and Braithwaite (2003) call 
for a ‘meta-regulation’ or ‘regulation of self-regulation’ involving multiple constituencies from 
the market, state and civil society sectors.  Meta-regulatory regimes need not replicate nation-
state based command-and-control regulation but can include international networks of 
governance and conventional legal mechanisms with enforcement and sanctioning powers, or 
even authorize non-governmental bodies like professional associations or civil society bodies to 
develop and enforce CSR standards.  One of the outcomes of meta-regulation is to ensure that 
stakeholders who might otherwise be excluded from corporate decision-making are given legal 
rights to be involved.  If these stakeholders play a more important role in corporate and 
institutional decision-making one would expect better social outcomes depending on the context 
of CSR initiatives (for example if CSR practices are aimed at providing better employment, 
educational, health or environmental outcomes for the community).   
 Alternative discourses of corporate accountability have less to do with the ‘good’ that 
corporations can do focusing instead on developing mechanisms that can monitor and prevent 
the ‘bad’ effects of corporate activity.  The effects of regulation and government intervention to 
promote CSR have not received much attention because CSR is conceptualized as a voluntary 
activity.  The dominant view is that strategic CSR as opposed to coercive CSR leads to better 
outcomes for both the firm and for society (Husted and de Jesus Salazar, 2006).  The 
‘philosophical’ approach to CSR proposes a moral argument why corporations should be socially 
responsible which implies government and policy intervention to promote CSR and support 
stakeholder rights (Windsor, 2006).  Proposed initiatives include mandatory corporate 
environmental and social reporting; extended liability to directors for corporate breaches of 
environmental and social laws; corporate liability for breeches of international laws and 
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agreements; rights of redress for affected communities; veto rights over developmental projects; 
and sanctions against corporations for negative social and environmental impacts including 
suspending stock exchange listing, and in extreme cases revoking the corporation’s charter or 
withdrawal of limited liability status (Bruno and Karliner, 2002).  Perhaps what is needed is 
some kind of supranational agency with enforcement powers working in partnership with a wide 
range of stakeholders in order to ensure that vulnerable communities either have the right to say 
no to forms of development that further marginalize them or the right to demand accountability 
from their governments and from transnational corporations. 
 
FUTURE PROSPECTS 
There is no escaping from the inherently normative basis of any theory of corporate social 
responsibility.  Such a normative theory would require corporate decision-making to be 
organized around delivering key social outcomes that the shareholder primacy model is not 
equipped to deliver.  Thus, if corporations are to play the role of social change agents a new 
ontology of the corporation is required that can open the way to more ‘polyphonic’ forms of 
organization (Hazen, 1993) requiring a plurality of voices and actors from economic, social, 
cultural, political, juridical and pedagogical spheres.  
 I point to three directions for a critical research agenda for CSR that goes beyond 
identifying the conditions for profit-maximization but examines instead how goals like 
emancipation, social justice, ecological balance, community and human development can be 
integrated with the governance of economic activity (Alvesson and Willmott, 2003). While much 
of current research focuses on the financial consequences of corporate social initiatives, we know 
little about the social consequences of these strategies.  To what extent do current corporate 
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initiatives actually achieve their intended outcomes?  Under what conditions are these goals 
achieved?  Instead of focusing on win-win situations, perhaps identifying and describing the 
conditions, challenges, and consequences of lose-lose or win-lose situations might reveal more 
interesting theoretical and practical challenges.  Much of the strident voices against corporate 
power draw attention to issues such as exploitation of labor in developing countries, abusive 
labor practices and environmental destruction.  These are practices that are easy targets.  We 
need more research on the social consequences of apparently beneficial economic development 
policies at the level of people, for example detailed ethnographic accounts of the social 
transformations and dislocations created by foreign direct investment, industrial development, 
industrial agriculture, privatization, offshore production and export processing zones (Harvey, 
2003; Ong, 1987).            
   A second research direction is to understand the power dynamics between market, state 
and civil society actors in the context of global climate change governance.  While we know that 
organizations tend to engage with stakeholders that have some level of power we do not know 
enough about how civil society actors can exercise authority over the global governance of 
climate change.  What discursive strategies do civil society actors use to contest the dominant 
economic discourse?  How do these strategies create new forms of authority and accountability?  
How do authority and capability of non-market actors influence corporate responses to climate 
change and the strategic and regulatory forms of climate change governance?  Exploring these 
questions can help us develop a more democratic process of climate change governance and offer 
ways of changing the normative framework of political decision-making enabling more 
meaningful corporate social initiatives to be developed and sustained.  
 A third research direction is to explore the discursive, strategic and regulatory dimensions 
  16 
of power that emerge from the governance of CSR.  Dimensions of power operate at different 
levels – from the macro political economy level (e.g. setting the global agenda through the 
identification of global problems like climate change and poverty framework) to the institutional 
level (e.g. how these problems are articulated and solutions presented by global institutions like 
the United Nations and World Bank as well as national governments), to the organizational level 
(e.g. how NGOs, community groups and corporations respond to the issues), to the managerial 
level (e.g. how managerial subjectivities influence CSR decision-making and how managers 
make tradeoffs between the social, economic and environment and the consequences of these 
decisions).  This multi-level multi-actor analysis will reveal how different dimensions of power 
result in strategic and regulatory forms of governance that can enable or constrain corporate CSR 
strategies.  Current formulations of CSR do not pay sufficient attention to issues of power, 
discourse and subjectivities and a critical perspective will enhance our understanding of both the 
limits of CSR and the institutional and political arrangements required to overcome these limits. 
 There are profound contradictions between societal expectations of corporations and what 
corporations can actually deliver.  Corporations cannot replace governments and despite the 
neoliberal push for diminished regulation a different regulatory environment may be required to 
address social ills in a more meaningful manner.  Broader social goals such as democracy, social 
justice, citizens’ health and welfare, environmental integrity, cultural identity are sometimes 
incompatible with the narrower corporate goals of self-interest and shareholder value and require 
a regulatory system with authority and democratic legitimacy that go beyond those provided by a 
market-based system (Bakan, 2004).  What kind of future awaits us depends on how we 
negotiate these profound contradictions and challenges.  Albert Einstein once said, ‘imagination 
is more important than knowledge’.  If this is true then we need to demand that our theories act 
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with an ‘organizational imagination’ in order to address questions of social inequality, cultural 
marginalization and ecological crisis which will enable researchers ‘to make linkages between 
history, structures and individual lives in the service of an intellectual and political purpose’ (Mir 
and Mir, 2002: 115).  A critical research agenda for CSR will attempt to recover and re-embed 
the social into the economic.   
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A Governance Framework for CSR 
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